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Abstract (200 words) 
 
There is increasing evidence that cash transfer (CT) programs decrease intimate partner violence (IPV); however, 
little is known about how CTs achieve this impact. We conducted a mixed method review of studies in low- and 
middle-income countries. Fourteen quantitative and nine qualitative studies met our inclusion criteria, of which 
eleven and six respectively demonstrated evidence that CTs decrease IPV. We found little support for increases in 
IPV, with only two studies showing overall mixed or adverse impacts. Drawing on these studies, as well as related 
bodies of evidence, we developed a program theory proposing three pathways through which CT could impact 
IPV: 1) Economic security and emotional wellbeing, 2) intra-household conflict, and 3) women’s empowerment. 
The economic security and wellbeing pathway hypothesizes decreases in IPV, while the other two pathways have 
ambiguous effects depending on program design features and behavioural responses to program components. 
Future studies should improve IPV measurement, empirical analysis of program mechanisms, and fill regional 
gaps. Program framing and complementary activities, including those with the ability to shift intra-household 
power relations are likely to be important design features for understanding how to maximize and leverage the 
impact of CTs for reducing IPV, and mitigating potential adverse impacts. 
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There is increasing interest among social epidemiologists and development economists in exploring the 
role that cash transfers (CT) have on intimate partner violence (IPV).  Social epidemiologists have demonstrated 
the pervasiveness of IPV globally, with one in three women estimated to experience at least one act of physical 
and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner in her lifetime (Devries et al. 2013).  Development economists have 
invested heavily in rigorous large-scale evaluations of social protection schemes, including CTs in low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs). As the body of research grows and sophistication of methodology increases, 
there has been a push to demonstrate the impacts of CTs on a wider range of outcomes beyond immediate 
program objectives related to poverty and food security, including intra-household gender dynamics, and more 
recently women’s experience of IPV.  Thus, the fields of Epidemiology and Economics have converged on the 
importance of understanding if CT and IPV are linked, and, which behavioural mechanisms may underpin this 
relationship.  
Theoretically, the mechanisms through which CTs affect IPV depend on the design of the CT program. At 
their core, CTs are economic safety nets designed to reduce poverty. Absolute resource theory and stress theory 
hypothesize that CTs may lead to decreases in IPV by improving a household’s economic situation, thereby 
reducing poverty-related stressors on individuals and households (Ellsberg et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2002; Vyas and 
Watts, 2009). Additionally, many CT programs target women as the main beneficiary, thus potentially affecting 
power dynamics within the household. To model these power dynamics, economists use variants of non-unitary 
household bargaining models in which an increase in a woman’s income (either earned or unearned as with a CT), 
may decrease violence by improving her bargaining power within the household (Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 1997; 
Tauchen et al. 1991). However, variants of the bargaining model also predict that an increase in women’s 
resources may put a woman at increased risk of IPV if men feel threatened and use violence to reassert authority 
in the relationship (Eswaran & Malhotra, 2011). Additionally, cash and other transfers targeted at women may 
also put them at risk if men use violence to extract cash or resources from women (Bloch & Rao, 2002). 
Theories in other disciplines such as the marital dependency and feminist theories likewise offer mixed 
predictions of the effect of cash on a woman’s risk of violence. Women who are economically dependent on their 
partner and are surrounded by institutions that promote gender inequality and male authority over female 
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behaviour, may be more susceptible to violence (Vyas & Watts 2009). CTs that target women may thus empower 
them both in the home and in the community, thereby reducing their risk of IPV. At the same time, if a woman’s 
partner feels further emasculated in his role as provider or threatened by her increased independence, he may 
redouble his efforts to assert authority, using violence if necessary (Heise & Garcia Moreno 2005; Hautzinger 
2003). As Jewkes (2002, p. 1424) observes,  
“An inability to meet social expectations of successful manhood can trigger a crisis of male identity. Violence 
against women is a means of resolving this crisis because it allows expression of power that is otherwise denied.” 
Finally, many CT programs include complementary activities such as trainings and/or linkages to health 
or educational services, either as a part of the programme or as a “conditionality” intended to influence 
beneficiary behaviour—components which themselves could affect IPV. For example, group-based trainings 
attended by women could reduce IPV by improving their knowledge, self-efficacy and self-esteem, thus 
enhancing their bargaining power.  Frequent interactions with other beneficiaries in the community could build 
women’s social capital and social ties (Brody & Vojtkova, 2015) or increase the social cost of men’s violent 
behavior (Stets, 1991; Van Wyk, Benson, Litton, & Demaris, 2003). Since variation in program design is large—
including size, duration and targeting of transfers, and overlay of complementary activities—implementers’ 
routinely make critical decisions that influence the programme’s potential impact on diverse beneficiary 
populations. 
While testing and validating theoretical models is needed to better understand and predict the impact that 
cash may have on IPV, there are also pressing programmatic and policy reasons to better understand these 
relationships and how they function across contexts and populations. First, the scale and reach of CT 
programming globally is both large and increasing. According to the World Bank’s State of Social Safety Nets 
(2015), 1.9 billion people worldwide are enrolled in some form of social safety net, with approximately 20 
programs operating in the average developing country and CTs present in nearly every country. In addition, CTs 
are expanding rapidly. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in 2010 about half of countries (21) in the 
region had some form of UCT programming—a number that reached 40 by 2014. In addition, CTs tend to be 
cost-effective, both in comparison with alternative in-kind transfers, as well as in comparison to alternative forms 
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of poverty-alleviation (Gentilini 2016; Margolies & Hoddinott 2014). Because of their scale, reaching 718 million 
individuals globally, .and relative cost-effectiveness, small changes in how transfers are designed and delivered, 
have the potential to influence their impact on IPV at the margin (World Bank 2015). Similarly, given the 
possibility of backlash and increases in IPV, it is essential that donors and implementing agencies understand 
these risks and work to minimize unintended harms from such programs. 
Recent reviews have sought to summarize evidence on this topic; however none have been sufficient to 
understand the complex relationship between cash transfers and women’s risk of IPV (Bardasi & Garcia 2014; 
Bastagli et al. 2016). Some have focused largely on quantitative evidence and have grouped IPV outcomes 
alongside other gendered outcomes such as women’s decision-making, agency, fertility or early marriage, thus 
providing little understanding of the mechanisms underlying the cash/violence relationship in different contexts. 
Those that have focused more narrowly on IPV as an outcome, have combined cash transfers with a range of other 
economic strengthening interventions from microfinance and savings schemes to the impact of women’s 
employment on IPV, making it impossible to isolate the impact of cash alone (Krishnan et al 2010; Gibbs et al 
2017).    
In order to fill this gap, we conducted a mixed-method review to help inform the understanding of the 
causal link between CTs and IPV in LMICs. First, we reviewed the existing body of rigorous quantitative and 
qualitative research linking CTs and IPV, with a focus both on mechanisms underlying the results and the 
implications of CT design features on the IPV outcome. Second, we build a program theory and evaluate the level 
of evidence existing in support of the various pathways, drawing on both the reviewed CT literature and evidence 
from other fields that support or refute steps along the hypothesized causal pathway. Finally, we propose program 
design components factors that may be key in delivering beneficial impacts and identify research gaps as well as 
discuss how upcoming evaluations could be tailored or modified to fill these gaps.   
2. Methods 
As a first step for our review, we conducted a scoping exercise. This comprised a rapid assessment of the 
known literature, hand searched articles, as well as articles obtained from general search engines (google scholar). 
Based on this initial rapid assessment, we conducted interviews via Skype with six experts (researchers and 
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implementers) with prior experience on the intersection between CTs and IPV. These interviews helped identify 
key literature, flag working papers or ongoing studies, and point to mechanisms and hypotheses that leading 
experts considered viable as potential pathways linking CTs and IPV.  
The second step consisted of a formal review process. Searches were conducted starting with the broad 
criteria: “cash transfers” and “violence” or “intimate partner violence” or “domestic violence.” Searches were 
conducted using electronic databases: PubMed, Medline, Web of knowledge, Web of science, Global Health and 
Social Sciences Abstracts. No search period restriction was imposed, nor requirement that the study be published 
in a peer-reviewed journal, however we did limit our search to documents written in English and Spanish. We ran 
forward and backward citation checks among all identified articles that met the inclusion criteria.  
 Table 1 describes the broad inclusion and exclusion criteria for our review. We focus exclusively on 
LMICs and include all types of cash transfers, whether they are conditional cash transfers (CCTs), unconditional 
cash transfers (UCTs), or bundled as part of multi-sectorial or component programming, regardless of their 
objective (e.g. food security, entrepreneurship or old-age pensions). We exclude two cases of lump-sum cash 
transfers which are included primarily as part of entrepreneurship and micro-credit programs (in Uganda and 
Burkina Faso), as they are likely to vary substantially in the mechanisms and impact pathways, however we 
include these two cases as part of the discussion. We focus on the outcomes of IPV (or domestic violence), which 
encompasses the following: physical, sexual, emotional and/or psychological violence, including controlling 
behaviors, typically experienced inside the household, regardless of the specific methodology used to collect or 
measure each indicator. IPV is further defined as violence between intimate partners (e.g. marital, co-habiting or 
dating partners), primarily experienced by women and perpetrated by men, however we do not exclude evidence 
in the opposite direction. We include evidence showing impacts on one or more combinations of IPV outcomes, 
including those that show different impacts by violence type. We exclude studies that only use proxy measures for 
IPV including general terms such as ‘conflict,’ ‘disputes’ or measures of autonomy or empowerment. For 
empirical studies, we focus on methodologies that allow a credible identification of the counterfactual, typically 
either randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or quasi-experimental designs with data collection at two or more 
points in time. For qualitative studies, we use the consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research (COREQ) 
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checklist: a 32-item checklist for interviews and focus group discussions to assess the quality of the qualitative 
studies that have been included in this review (Tong et al, 2007). Two independent researchers scored the articles 
using three domains— (1) research team and reflexivity, (ii) study design and methods, and (iii) data analysis and 
reporting—to assign a score of high, medium or low quality. We did not exclude any studies according to this 
assessment but report on the scores achieved by each study.  
Table 1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for review of cash transfers on intimate partner violence 
Domain Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Setting Low- and middle-income countries High income countries 
Program typologies Cash transfers (regular income support over 
time), regardless of stated objectives of 
program, in addition to or alongside other 
complementary interventions 
Other forms of social safety nets, including 
micro-loans or financing, public works or 
employment programs; lump sum cash 
transfers if they are a minor component of 
the above programming typologies 
Indicators Emotional, physical, sexual IPV (including 
homicide and assault), controlling behaviors, 
psychological and economic violence 
between co-habiting, dating or marital 
partners  
Proxy measures for IPV such as “conflict”, 
“disagreements”, “disputes” or 
autonomy/empowerment measures, as well 
as perpetration from non-partners 
Methodology 
(quantitative) 
Use of rigorous methodology to link cash 
transfers to IPV, including a credible 
counterfactual  
Does not provide sufficiently rigorous 
research design, or description of analysis 
to credibly claim that pattern or results can 
be attributed to the program  
Methodology 
(qualitative) 
Studies that explicitly discussed and provided 
evidence on the link between cash transfers 
and IPV; In order to assess quality of studies, 
we used the COREQ checklist. These were 
scored on a high, medium and low scale   
Studies were assessed on the basis of 
methodological limitations of individual 
studies, relevance to the review question, 
coherence across studies and adequacy of 
data 
Notes: IPV = Intimate partner violence; COREQ = Consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research 
 
For both quantitative and qualitative studies, we first read the content to identify themes and mechanisms. 
Thereafter, we developed a matrix summarizing key information regarding the program design, implementation, 
and program features of interest. For quantitative studies, we compiled information on methodological design, 
sample sizes, indicators and impacts. For qualitative studies, we summarize methods, sample sizes, and implied 
impact of CT and IPV (increase, decrease, mixed or null impacts). For both quantitative and qualitative studies, 
information was also extracted, where available, on the underlying mechanisms that authors advanced or tested as 
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possibly responsible for the impacts observed. Descriptions or mechanisms that relied on the interpretation and 
opinion of the authors were treated as theoretical insights (hypotheses), rather than evidence.  
To further refine the program theory and assess different steps in the hypothesized causal chain, we 
conducted comprehensive, but non-exhaustive reviews of other bodies of literature. We employed snowball 
sampling to identify additional studies for further explanation building, such as tracking references in footnotes, 
endnotes, and references of potentially relevant articles. The protocol was registered in the Prospero database 
(CRD42015024511).  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Review of programs and quantitative evidence 
Table 2 summarizes the program components from the identified core quantitative papers, organized by 
country (in alphabetical order) and year of publication. For the quantitative evidence, we report impacts for all 
qualifying IPV indicators analyzed as part of the study; however we do not present results for each sub-sample or 
heterogeneity analysis. Instead we summarize results of additional analysis as part of column 13 to help unpack 
potential mechanisms.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The justification for this decision is primarily because studies vary to the extent that they conduct additional analysis, which 
would potentially skew results towards specific studies. In addition, the choice of which subsample analysis is explored is left 
to authors, thus we may not capture an unbiased picture of potential heterogeneous effects when comparing results side by 
side. Finally, the methodology utilized to analyze subsamples varies by study. It should be noted that no study was explicitly 
set up (sampled) to conduct heterogeneity analysis. 
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In total, we identified 14 studies meeting our inclusion criteria: six were published in peer-reviewed papers, eight 
were technical reports or working papers. In total, nine countries were represented, with multiple studies in each 
of Mexico, Ecuador and Peru. Only three studies were in settings outside Latin America (Bangladesh, Kenya and 
South Africa) and in only one case (a World Food Program pilot in Ecuador targeted to Colombian refugees) 
could settings qualify as humanitarian or post-conflict. Ten out of 14 studies evaluated government programs 
(column 3), which were typically designed as CCTs conditional on health and education co-responsibilities; three 
evaluated UCTs with several providing additional services (e.g. behavior change communication (BCC)) together 
with in-kind or other transfers (e.g. food or food vouchers). Programs provided a mix of flat and variable transfers 
(according to household size and demographic composition), ranging from 6 – 50% of baseline household 
expenditures (Column 5). The majority of programs implemented some type of means-based targeting to identify 
extremely poor households as beneficiaries alongside demographic criteria such as the number of children of 
specific ages residing in the household. Additionally, nearly all programs targeted women as the main recipient, 
with the exception of one program in Kenya which randomized targeting to women or men. Finally, the majority 
of programs delivered benefits on a monthly basis (Column 6). 
Study designs are nearly all experimental (7 were either longitudinal or cross-sectional RCTs) or quasi-
experimental (5), with the remaining two using non-experimental designs (Column 7). Sample sizes at the 
individual level range from 1,010 women (Kenya, Give Directly) to 8,065 women (Peru, Juntos). Additionally, 
several evaluations use administrative data aggregated typically at the municipal level (in Brazil, Colombia and 
Uruguay).  Data collection for studies ranged from 1998 to 2015, with most taking place from 2004 – 2012 
(Column 9).  In only one case did authors collect data post-intervention (e.g. 6 to 10 months after the program 
ended) to assess if impacts were sustained after the program ended (Roy et al. 2017). 
The 14 studies examined a range of IPV outcome indicators (Column 10). Overall, 56 outcomes were 
analyzed, including 34 measures of physical or sexual violence (13 physical violence, 10 sexual, 4 combined 
physical and/or sexual, 2 combined physical and/or emotional violence, 2 combined 
physical/sexual/psychological and economic violence, 2 IPV reported to the health and justice systems, and 1 
administrative data on homicide). Additionally, 13 used measures of emotional violence, and 13 used other 
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typologies (4 controlling behaviors, 3 psychological violence, 2 economic violence, 2 threats of physical IPV, 2 
combined measure of physical/sexual/psychological and economic violence, and 1 aggressive behavior2). It 
should be noted that some experts conceptualize controlling behaviors as a risk factor for IPV, rather than a type 
of violence itself. The studies operationalized IPV in a variety of ways.  The majority used some form of the 
conflict tactics scale (CTS), with recall periods typically 6 to 12 months, while a minority included lifetime 
measures (the latter may be less sensitive to a short-term intervention). The exception were the three papers which 
used administrative data, as well as one that asked about aggressive behavior following a partner’s consumption 
of alcohol (Rivera et al. 2005). For the mean and effect size, we have maintained the same number of significant 
digits or reporting as in the original reviewed papers.  
Across all 56 outcomes, 20 (or 36%) are statistically significant and negative at the p<0.10 level or higher 
(suggesting that the CT reduced IPV) while only one (or 2%) is statistically significant and positive at the p<0.10 
level or higher (suggesting that the CT increased IPV). The remaining 63% showed no significant change in IPV 
due to the CT. For significant reductions in IPV, the percentage varies by category of violence examined: 44% of 
studies assessing physical and/or sexual IPV demonstrated a significant reduction in violence, whereas only 8% of 
those assessing emotional violence, and 38% assessing other outcomes (e.g. controlling behaviors), did so.  The 
one case where an increase was found in emotional IPV was in the Give Directly pilot in Western Kenya when 
comparing to non-treatment households in the same villages (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016). However, in the 
Kenya evaluation, reductions were also found for both physical and sexual violence when comparing alternate 
study arms (e.g. what the authors term the across village, rather than within village estimates).  
Therefore, when considering study-level impacts, overall, 11 out of the 14 studies found decreases in IPV 
attributable to the program, 1 found mixed impacts (both decreases and increases) and 2 found no impacts. The 
two studies finding no impact are from Mexico. One of the studies looks at long-term impacts of Oportunidades 
approximately nine to 13 years after program initiation via creation of comparable beneficiary and non-
beneficiary groups using national surveys (Bobonis et al. 2015). The authors hypothesize that this lack of impact, 
which contrasts with the decreases they find in the short-term could be due to marital dissolution and decreases in 
overall rates of IPV overtime, however the authors are unable to test these theories directly. The second study 
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examines aggressive behavior after drinking using data from the 1998 round of the Oportunidades evaluation 
(Angelucci 2008). Although no average effect is found, there are treatment effects (both positive and negative) by 
various household characteristics and by transfer size—however there are likely to be endogenous and it is 
unclear how these differential effects should be interpreted.    
Authors have put forward various ideas about how CT programs could affect a woman’ risk of violence, 
but few have tested their hypothesized mechanisms empirically. Cash could decrease violence by:  
1)  Increasing women’s empowerment or bargaining power, or changing intra-household gender 
dynamics (mentioned by all 12 studies documenting decreases, except Rivera et al. 2005, with evidence 
suggesting the pathway could be valid by all except Rodriguez 2015);  
2)  Decreasing household poverty and therefore poverty-related stress or emotional wellbeing (mentioned 
by 4 studies: Roy et al. 2017; Rodriguez 2015; Hidrobo et al. 2016; Haushofer & Shapiro 2016, with 
evidence suggesting pathway could be valid by all studies except Rodriguez 2015); 
 3)  Increasing interaction with the health sector, thereby improving women’s overall health and making 
her more resilient to abuse (mentioned by 1 study: Ritter Burga 2014, including evidence suggesting the 
pathway could be valid); and 
4) Encouraging greater interaction with other women and village leaders, which increases a woman’s 
social capital and social ties, and could increase the social cost of men perpetrating violence (mentioned 
by 1 study, however not tested directly: Roy et al. 2017).  
In only two cases did authors hypothesize reasons for potential increases in IPV, including:  
1) A partner seeking to extract resources/CT from his wife (mentioned by 1 study: Bobonis et al. 2013, 
however not tested directly); and  
2) Male backlash, specifically due to partners feeling threatened by women usurping their traditional 
‘identity’ as a provider (Angelucci 2008; with evidence suggesting pathway could be valid). 
In one study (Hidrobo & Fernald 2013), authors acknowledge that there may be multiple mechanisms at 
play that could cancel each other out (e.g. female bargaining and male backlash). Finally, in one study, with non-
significant results, the authors conjecture that the lack of impact could be due to either increased marital 
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dissolution over time (beneficiary women are more able to leave abusive relationships), or a diffusion of norms 
rejecting IPV (Bobonis et al. 2015). 
  
3.2 Review of programs and qualitative evidence 
Table 3 summarizes the program components from the identified core qualitative papers3, organized 
similarly to Table 2, by country (in alphabetical order) and author and year of publication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 Note that these counts by violence typology sum to greater than 56, as certain classifications count in several categories for 
combined indicators. 
3 Some of the studies were mixed methods, but the quantitative sections did not meet the inclusion criteria for the quantitative 
part of this review. We have only analyzed the qualitative data and to the extent possible, have presented results from the 
qualitative sections.  
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In total, we identified nine qualitative studies meeting our inclusion criteria: two were published in peer-
reviewed journals and seven in working papers or technical reports. In terms of quality assessment using the 
COREQ check-list (column 13), 4 of the included studies were given a high score and 5 were given medium 
scores. Overall, the studies represented seven countries, including two assessing Oportunidades/Progresa in 
Mexico, one each from Ecuador and Nicaragua, three from SSA (Somalia, Uganda, and Lesotho) and one from 
Turkey (column 2). Four of the qualitative studies were NGO-led programs, of which two were external 
evaluations of the same CT implemented by Action Against Hunger in northern Uganda in 2012 and 2014; three 
were government-run programs (two UCTs and one CCT) and two were run by international organizations 
(column 3). From the total, four interventions were UCTs, one provided cash, food or voucher conditional on 
attending nutrition training and four were CCTs (column 4). Women were targeted as the main recipient in most 
programs; despite cases where the household or a small proportion of males received the transfer (Lesotho and 
Ecuador) (column 6). In almost all the studies, either focus group discussions (2 studies), in-depth interviews (2 
studies) or a combination of the two methods (5 studies) were used as the method of data collection. One study in 
Nicaragua used an ethnographic approach, with semi-structured interviews and participant observation to explore 
perceptions of the program (column 7). Data collection for studies ranged from 1999-2014, with the majority 
taking place between 2011-2014 (column 8).  
The nine qualitative studies explored a range of dynamics relevant to CTs and IPV, including addressing 
how the receipt of cash influenced household gender relations; whether conflict over resources within the 
household increased or decreased; whether there was a change in couple and/or family relationships; and whether 
receipt of the transfer, affected women’s decision-making authority.  Some studies focused specifically on these 
themes, while others were more general, exploring the impact of CT on poverty alleviation with sub-objectives 
focused on gender relations and household decision-making (column 10). Five of the studies reviewed showed a 
reduction in IPV after receipt of the CT (Buller et al., 2016; Slater & Mphale, 2008; Adato & Roopnaraine 2004; 
Yildirim et al 2014; Angeles 2012); one study showed mixed results with IPV decreasing in some households and 
increasing in others (Nuwakora, 2014); three studies showed no clear effect of the CT on IPV (Adato et al. 2000a; 
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Maldonado 2005; Wasilkowska, 201; however in one case the authors note that IPV was not reported freely, 
which might have influenced these results, Adato et al. 2000a).    
Authors of these qualitative studies suggested that the following mechanisms could explain decreases in 
IPV:  
1) Reductions in poverty-related stress (mentioned by 5 studies; Adato & Roopnaraine 2004, Angeles 
2012, Yildrim et al. 2014, Nuwakora 2014, Buller et al. 2016);  
2) Reduction in household tensions leading to fewer conflicts (mentioned by 4 studies; Slater & Mphale, 
2008, Yildrim 2011, Angeles 2012, Buller et al. 2016); and 
3) Increased women’s decision-making power in the household and feelings of empowerment (mentioned 
by 5 studies; Maldonado 2006, Slater & Mphale 2008, Angeles 2012, Nuwakora 2014, Buller et al. 2016).  
In fewer studies, authors suggested increases in IPV through: 
1) The forced extraction of money/cash by a woman’s male partner (mentioned by 2 studies; Adato 
2000a, Nuwakora 2014); 
2) As a compensatory mechanism to re-assert authority when a man feels his masculinity is being 
threatened (mentioned by 1 study; Nuwakora 2014);  
3) An increase in household tensions around household decision-making (mentioned by 1 study; 
Wasilkowska 2012).  
 
4. Program Theory for understanding the relationship between CTs and IPV 
 Our review suggests that there are three primary pathways through which CTs may affect IPV. For ease 
of reference, we have named these the: 1) economic security and emotional wellbeing pathway; 2) intra-
household conflict pathway; and 3) women’s empowerment pathway. The first pathway, operates primarily 
through household-level mechanisms, evolving from a pure ‘income effect’ of cash into the household (regardless 
of who is the primary recipient), which reduces poverty-related stress and improves emotional wellbeing. The 
second pathway works through the effect of cash on marital dynamics and conflict: Increased access to cash, 
particularly in very poor households, can lessen conflict by reducing arguments over tight budgets and daily 
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money needed to run the household. Alternatively, if CT funds are used for expenditures not intended to benefit 
all household members, for example to purchase alcohol or tobacco, cash could create new sources of marital 
conflict. Finally, cash or complementary interventions could, if appropriately targeted, increase woman’s 
bargaining power, strengthening her self-worth, and potentially increasing her perceived value to the household. 
Similar to the conflict pathway, this pathway may have mixed effects depending on how men respond to potential 
shifts in resources or power dynamics. On the one hand, some men may feel threatened in situations where their 
wives are empowered, which can lead to backlash and increased IPV as men attempt to reassert control and their 
identity as the household provider or dominant decision maker. On the other hand, some men may accept this 
increased position of women in the household and decrease IPV in order to keep her satisfied in the marriage.  
Figure 1 summarises these pathways and articulates the various steps in the hypothesized causal chain. 
The items in the far-left box represent different elements of the program design that can influence its impact, such 
as the size, frequency and duration of transfers, and the targeting criteria, including the particular vulnerability 
and poverty profiles of the beneficiary population and whether or not women are explicit recipients of the transfer. 
We hypothesize that the specific pathways or causal mechanisms that become operative in any instance may be a 
function of: 1) the design features of the CT itself; and 2) how a woman’s partner reacts to the transfer; and 3) the 
context of the CT program, including underlying contextual factors such as the gender regimes, social norms, and 
local laws and policies. In the following sections, we explain stylized versions of each pathway, relying where 
necessary on a broader evidence base than the CT and IPV literature, and analyse the degree to which data from 
the review either supports or refutes the hypothesised pathway. 
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4.1 Economic security and emotional wellbeing pathway 
As CTs are primarily designed as an economic social safety net, the most generalizable pathway 
resulting in decreases in IPV is through improved household economic security and associated decreases 
in household poverty (e.g. increased financial and food security, increased savings, assets and 
investments, and improved financial coping strategies). These improvements, in turn have the potential to 
improve emotional wellbeing of household members, including decreasing poverty-related stress and 
improving mental health. This positive effect could directly lead to decreases in IPV, or work indirectly 
through decreased use of alcohol as a negative coping mechanism in response to poverty and financial 
stress.  
CTs and increased economic security (decreased poverty): There is a large and robust literature 
across different geographical regions and program typologies showing that in general, CTs have 
significant positive impacts on a range of household-level economic security outcomes, including poverty 
rates, food security, household expenditure and consumption, household durable and productive assets, 
income generation and labour force participation, and savings and investments (Bastagli et al. 2016; 
Banerje et al. 2015; Handa et al. 2017; Handa et al. 2016; Hidrobo et al. 2014; Hidrobo et al. 2017; Natali 
et al. 2016). Further, there is a growing literature documenting the positive local economy impacts of 
CTs, implying positive spill-overs on non-beneficiary households in terms of economic outcomes (Taylor 
et al. 2016). For this pathway to be effective, program design and implementation components, such as 
the relative size of the transfer, and the regularity and duration of benefits, are important factors in 
determining the magnitude of impact of CTs. 
Economic security and improved emotional wellbeing: There is increasing evidence that poverty 
and poor mental health are linked in a two-way, reinforcing relationship. On one hand, poverty is a risk 
factor for poor mental health and mental disorders though malnutrition, stress, substance abuse, social 
exclusion and exposure to trauma and violence (the social causation hypothesis), while on the other, poor 
mental health increases risk of poverty due to increased health expenditures, reduced productivity, stigma 
and loss of employment and earnings (the social drift hypothesis) (Lund et al. 2010). Whereas these 
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linkages have been well explored in developed countries, only in the last few decades has the relationship 
been confirmed in LMICs. Lund and colleagues (2010) conducted a systematic review of the 
epidemiologic literature in LMICs to assess the relationship between poverty and common mental 
disorders, finding that among 115 studies reviewed, most reported positive associations between a variety 
of poverty measures and negative mental health outcomes (73% to 79% of studies). However, the strength 
of this relationship depended on the specific poverty dimensions examined. Corroborating these findings, 
a meta-analysis using 60 studies found that individuals of low socio-economic status had higher odds of 
being depressed (Lorant et al. 2003), and a global analysis of over 139,000 individuals from 131 countries 
shows a positive relationship between income and emotional wellbeing, both within and across countries 
(Sacks et al. 2010). These findings are supported by qualitative evidence on the effects of transfers on 
beneficiary families across regions:  
“In my household it was like happiness, we all got along, with my children, with my husband […] 
in my house we were happy […] because before we did not have enough money for those things 
[food].” (Ecuador, Buller et al 2016, p.8) 
“Apart from the cash, we have been united as a group. The project has brought happiness in the 
family, as husbands and wives. It has also united parents to their bigger children.” (Uganda, 
Nuwakora 2014, p.16) 
Haushofer and Fehr (2014) provide insights into the psychology of poverty by summarizing 
evidence which suggests that poverty-related stress causes negative affective states (including sadness and 
anger) which increase short-sighted and risk-adverse decision making and other economic behaviors 
which re-inforce poverty. Overall, evidence confirms a strong relationship between poverty and mental 
health in developing settings.   
Although the relationship between poverty and poor mental health is well established, we know 
less about the typologies of interventions which are successful at breaking the two-way cycle. A recent 
review of programming concluded that although there is good evidence that a variety of mental health 
programs have positive impacts on economic outcomes, overall the mental health effects of poverty 
alleviation programs are inconclusive (Lund et al. 2011). However, CCTs were identified as a caveat to 
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the latter statement. In recent years there is also increasing evidence that UCTs have potential to improve 
mental health and wellbeing of children, youth and adults in recipient households. In particular, there is 
evidence that CTs have positive impacts on measures of happiness and life satisfaction, stress and 
depression (Daidone et al. 2015; Kilburn et al. 2016a; Haushofer & Shapiro 2016; Ozer 2011); child 
cognitive and behavioral assessments, cortisol concentration biomarkers, and adolescent psychological 
distress (Baird et al. 2013; Fernald & Gunnar 2009; Kilburn et al. 2016b).  
  Emotional wellbeing and IPV: As with poverty and mental health, evidence suggests that the 
relationship between poor mental health and IPV victimization is bidirectional (Machisa et al 2017). In a 
recent systematic review and meta-analysis of longitudinal studies, Devries and colleagues (2013) found 
that for women and men, depressive symptoms were associated with recent experience of IPV, and 
conversely that recent experience of IPV was associated with recent depressive symptoms (the latter only 
for women). A recent study including 10,178 men in six countries in Asia and the Pacific found that 
depressive symptoms increase the risk of physical, sexual and emotional IPV perpetration, after adjusting 
for childhood exposure to violence (Fulu et al 2013).  Alongside depression, the literature also identifies 
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health disorders as associated with IPV 
victimization. For example, a review of the cross-sectional psychiatric morbidity and populations surveys, 
found associations between all mental disorders and IPV victimization in both men and women (Oram et 
al 2014) and a systematic review and meta-analysis of 41 studies found a higher risk of experiencing IPV 
among women with depressive disorders, anxiety disorders and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in 
comparison to women without mental health disorders (Trevillion et al 2012).  
The link between poor emotional wellbeing, in particular situational stress, and IPV, has also 
been documented. Several studies, including one among couples in Thailand, have demonstrated an 
association between current life stressors and the risk of experiencing and/or perpetrating IPV (Hoffman 
et al. 1994; Cano and Vivian 2001). Additionally, a study among US Air Force Active Duty members, 
documented a strong effect of financial stress on the risk of perpetrating IPV among both men and women 
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(Slep et al 2010). There is also emerging evidence that childhood abuse or other adversities may 
potentiate the impact of recent stressors on risk of IPV perpetration, a hypothesis known as the “stress 
sensitization theory.” Among 34,653 US adults, for example, the risk of perpetrating IPV among men 
with high current life stress was 10.1 percentage points greater among men with histories of high versus 
low childhood adversity scores (Roberts et al 2011). 
Economic security, alcohol abuse and IPV: A final mechanism through which improved 
economic security may affect the risk of IPV is through reduced alcohol consumption via improved 
emotional wellbeing. Although the relationship between economic security and alcohol use is complex, 
many studies show that the largest burden of alcohol-related mortality and morbidity falls on populations 
with low socio-economic status (Jones et al. 2015).  Likewise, a robust body of evidence from LMICs 
show a strong and consistent association between men’s use of alcohol and women’s risk of IPV 
(Abramsky et al 2011; Hindin et al. 2008, Gage 2005; Graham et al. 2008; Dalal et al 2009; Foran & 
O’Leary 2008); one systematic review pooled the results of 11 studies and found that harmful use of 
alcohol was associated with a 4.6-fold increased risk of exposure to IPV compared to mild or no alcohol 
use (Gil-Gonzalez et al 2006). Studies suggest that alcohol affects risk of IPV in multiple ways: as a 
trigger for arguments (Heise, 2012), by affecting problem solving and other cognitive abilities (Hoaken et 
al. 1998), by lowering inhibitions and making it easier to misinterpret verbal and non-verbal cues 
(Klostermann & Fals-Stewart, 2006), and by playing into culturally defined scripts about how alcohol 
affects behavior (Quigley & Leonard, 2006).  While alcohol alone is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
cause violence, a recent review concluded that it meets all the epidemiological criteria for being 
considered a contributing cause of IPV (Leonard & Quigley, 2017).  
4.2 Intra-household conflict pathway  
While greater financial stability may reduce IPV by improving emotional wellbeing, access to 
cash can also affect violence directly by either reducing or increasing fodder for arguments.  More cash 
can reduce marital conflict over money or it can increase conflict if the money is diverted to temptation 
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goods or partners disagree on how the money is spent.  In the systematic review, Vives-Cases and Gil-
Gonzalez (2009) found that marital conflict was significantly associated with IPV in 10 out of 11 studies 
identified.  
Decreased conflicts over money: Conflicts over money have been identified by different studies 
in poverty contexts as a trigger for violent episodes in the couple (Rabbani 2008, Fehringer 2014). Our 
review showed that CTs seem to have an impact in reducing arguments of this type. From the papers 
included in our review, Buller et al. (2016) mixed methods analysis found that provision of cash to 
households reduces IPV, partially by eliminating the need for women to negotiate the daily cash she 
needs to buy food for the family. During qualitative interviews post-trial, women observed that transfers 
meant they didn’t have to ask their husbands for money, which eliminated a source of conflict in the 
relationship. Furthermore, Angeles (2008) in Uganda found that women reported that there was a 
decrease in fights that occurred in competing over scarce resources. The CT helped pay for a number of 
items such as school fees, medical bills or immediate needs, effectively reducing the arguments over 
money. Likewise, Yildrim et al (2014) found that according to respondents, a majority of fights and 
continued IPV appeared to be due to financial difficulties, with the majority of victims reporting IPV 
decreases or cessation after they started receiving the transfer. 
“There had been many fights. Because children needed many things that we could not 
have afforded. I asked my husband and he used to say there is no money. Then I used 
to get upset and started to yell. We had many fights because of poverty. Not only 
for us, for all poor, fights come from suffering.” (Turkey, Yidrim et al 2014, p.72) 
 
Increased conflict over temptation goods: It is also possible that an unintended effect of CTs 
could be an increase in spending on temptation goods by either men or women. This relationship has 
generally not been supported by the literature although there is limited global evidence on certain types of 
temptation goods (e.g. gambling, prostitution as compared to consumable goods). Evans and Popova 
(2017) conducted a systematic review on the link between CTs (both conditional and unconditional) in 
LMIC and temptation goods, primarily alcohol and tobacco. The authors included 50 estimates from 19 
studies and concluded that there is no systematic evidence that beneficiaries increase spending on alcohol 
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and tobacco, a conclusion also reached by a recent analysis of seven government UCT programs in Africa 
(Handa et al. 2017). It is important to note that this does not mean that cash is not partially used to 
purchase these goods, but rather that there is no systematic difference from spending in non-beneficiary 
households. 
 4.3 Women’s empowerment pathway 
CTs are often hypothesized to empower women either through increasing their direct access to 
cash, information (through trainings), or social networks (via group activities)—all of which can enhance 
women’s sense of empowerment. If resources are placed in the hands of women, her relative control of 
resources within the household improves, thus increasing her bargaining power and ability to negotiate 
her preferences. Direct receipt of cash also increases her financial autonomy and contributes to enhanced 
self-efficacy and confidence, potentially shifting the balance of power between the woman and her male 
partner. 
Depending on how her partner reacts, this shift in power can either increase or decrease a 
woman’s risk of IPV.  Greater female empowerment can strengthen a woman’s ability to exit an abusive 
relationship or at least credibly threaten to leave, which might deter her husband from using violence.  
Likewise, if the man’s reaction is positive and accepting, risk of violence may decrease as the man comes 
to appreciate both his wife’s competency and the added resources she brings to the household.  Greater 
female empowerment, however, could result in more violence if a man reacts negatively to his wife’s 
willingness to assert her preferences more forcefully. Some men may feel threatened by this shift in 
power and may use violence to reassert their dominance and male authority in the family.  
CTs and empowerment: Case studies support the notion that CTs can have transformational 
impacts on women’s empowerment through improved decision making and feelings of independence 
from partners (Yildrim 2014; Nuwakora 2014; Patel 2012). As women from Northern Uganda and 
Mexico reported: 
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“Earlier, we used to farm as a family. However, my husband would sometimes sell household 
items without consulting me. But now that I have my own money, I can have a say on how to 
spend income. Moreover, I cultivate the gardens together with my husband […]”. (Uganda, 
Nuwakora 2014, p.9). 
“I have seen that all mothers, like indigenous women that we are, things changed a lot. I 
notice it because now women participate a lot, when there is an assembly, or meeting, or 
‘plática’. They participate a lot because they have this responsibility, in order for the support 
[transfer]to come.” (Mexico, Adato 2000, p.69). 
 
Numerous studies have also shown that CTs increase women’s savings and income earning 
opportunities, suggesting that CTs may affect women's bargaining power (Perova et al. 2012; Natali et al. 
2016; Green et al. 2015). However, the broader evidence is mixed. In a recent synthesis of qualitative and 
quantitative reviews and key evidence, van den Bold and colleagues (2013) find that although qualitative 
evidence on CCTs, largely from Latin America and the Caribbean, generally points to positive impacts on 
empowerment indicators, quantitative results are mixed. More recent studies focusing on the Africa 
region have come to the same broad conclusions (Bonilla et al. 2017), and others have raised competing 
arguments that CTs can reinforce traditional gender norms, or place additional burdens on women’s time 
use, further reinforcing gender inequities (Chant 2008; Molyneux 2006). At least part of the ambiguity 
around this linkage can be attributed to the diverse set of indicators used to measure empowerment and 
the inherent difficulty in drawing conclusions based on few quantitative indicators of intra-household 
bargaining (Peterman et al. 2015; Seymour & Peterman 2017). Adding to the complexities, intra-
household empowerment is highly contextual, and there has been no clear consensus within and across 
disciplines of how to best measure it (Malhortra & Schuler 2005). Thus, although there are promising 
case studies, there are also mixed impacts, and a lack of consolidated evidence across program typologies 
and diverse contexts with differing gendered norms. 
Shifts in relationship power and IPV: Another strand of literature has reviewed how 
empowerment and shifts in relationship power may decrease or increase IPV (Hughes et al. 2015; Perova 
2012). Women’s risk of IPV based on the extent of her financial independence and self-confidence is 
complex, context-specific and contingent on factors such as: socio-cultural contexts of households, 
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characteristics of households and individuals, and particularities of empowerment processes themselves 
(Hughes et al. 2015). In terms of socio-cultural factors, in patriarchal contexts women’s empowerment is 
more likely to lead to increased conflict and IPV at least in the short term. Hence, the relative status of 
women and men in terms of decision-making and how their power and resources compare to each other is 
an important contributing factor for increased IPV (Hughes et al 2015). This seems especially common in 
situations where a man is unable to fulfil his gender-ascribed role as “bread-winner” and a woman is 
beginning to contribute relatively more to family maintenance, or where a woman takes a job that defies 
prevailing social convention (Hughes et al., 2015). This aligns with research by Maldonado, Najera and 
Segovia (2005) from Mexico that showed that significant income increases to women may threaten men’s 
status causing husbands with more traditional gender views to reassert control through violence. Overall, 
however, the risk of increased IPV could also decline over time as both men’s individual attitudes and 
broader social attitudes become more accepting of women’s increased economic activity and financial 
autonomy (Ahmed 2005). For example, some participants in the South African IMAGE intervention 
reported that the increased self-confidence, social support and communication skills gained from being 
part of a combined micro-finance and training initiative resulted in improved partner communication, 
preventing any conflict escalating into violence (Kim et al., 2007).  
5. Conclusion and policy, programmatic and research implication 
We conducted a mixed-method review of the impact of CTs on IPV in LMICs and built a 
program theory to help understand the mechanisms behind this impact. In total, we identified 14 
quantitative and nine qualitative studies that met our inclusion criteria, of which 11 and six respectively 
showed support that CTs decrease IPV. We found little support for increases in IPV.  Only two of our 
reviewed studies had overall mixed or adverse impacts. These findings, paired with the scale and relative 
cost-effectiveness of CTs, suggest that they have the potential to decrease IPV at the margin across large 
populations of vulnerable groups. However, across the 56 quantitative outcomes measured, approximately 
63% were insignificant, suggesting that CTs may have different impacts on different types of violence 
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within the same study. Transfers appear to reduce physical and/or sexual IPV more consistently than 
emotional abuse or controlling behaviours. This finding is an apparent contradiction since several of the 
pathways focus on emotional states which would suggest impacts on emotional and psychological IPV 
before trickling down to physical and sexual IPV. However, we conjecture that this could in part be due to 
measurement issues, as emotional IPV was less measured in studies, and as definitions of emotional 
abusive acts vary across cultures and are thus are more difficult to define.  
As CTs are primarily a policy tool to respond to poverty and vulnerability, it is unlikely that 
large-scale institutional programming will be designed with the specific objective of decreasing IPV. 
However, if small design changes have potential to decrease IPV, a key indicator of wellbeing and gender 
equity, transfer programs have the scope to realize significant gains across sectors, at a lower cost than 
violence-specific programming.  Research to better understand how CTs affect IPV and under what 
conditions, can help policymakers maximize these gains while minimizing any unintended negative 
impacts of CT programs. As collection of IPV measures in multi-topic surveys are likely to imply 
significant survey logistical costs, expanding the feasibility of experimental ‘light touch’ methods are 
likely to aid in understanding of dynamics in generalized programming (Peterman et al. 2017b).   
We found evidence to support all three hypothesized pathways: economic security and emotional 
wellbeing; intra-household conflict; and women’s empowerment. We also found substantial evidence 
from related literature to support each step in the proposed causal chains, with the exception of increasing 
violence by exacerbating conflict over the consumption of temptation goods. According to our program 
theory, the economic security and emotional wellbeing pathway is the only one that exclusively reduces 
IPV; the other two may increase or decrease IPV, depending on whether additional cash aggravates or 
soothes relationship conflict and/or how men respond to women’s increased empowerment. How these 
pathways play out depends on intra-household gender dynamics, which are in turn are affected by local 
gender regimes and socio-economic inequalities within a setting or beneficiary population. Thus far, 
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quantitative evaluations in particular have not been well designed to measure these mechanisms, 
particularly those relating to relationship dynamics and behavioural intra-household measures.    
The qualitative studies suggest that in highly patriarchal settings, shifts in household dynamics 
that are less challenging to traditional gender norms are less likely to prompt violence.  Likewise, 
programs that generate smaller shifts in relationship power appear more easily accepted by men than 
those catalysing larger disruptions (Wasilkowska 2011, Slate and Mphale 2008, Maldonado 2005). For 
example, Buller and colleagues (2016) note that increased cash and in-kind transfers to women was 
accepted by Colombian and Ecuadorian men in part because it was intended for children’s nutrition, a 
domain already within the domestic responsibilities of women. Indeed, how a program is “framed” and 
the meaning imbued to cash by a program’s stated intent (e.g. for women’s entrepreneurship versus child 
health) may influence the transfer’s impact on gender dynamics and IPV as much as any other program 
feature. More “acceptable” shifts might also be achieved by making smaller, more regular transfers 
(conducive to small household purchases managed by women), rather than larger or lump sum transfers 
(Wasilkowska 2011). It should be noted, however, that the Kenya GiveDirectly study tested lump sum 
versus periodic transfers and found that the difference did not significantly affect the magnitude or 
impacts on IPV (Haushofer & Shapiro 2016). Understanding the importance of transfer size and other 
design features on intra-household dynamics is important, as economic security and poverty impacts are 
likely to be larger with increasing size of the transfer relative to pre-program household consumption, 
thus suggesting a potential program design trade-off.  
The recipient of the CT, is also likely to be a key factor in understanding potential for impacts on 
IPV. While empirical evidence is scarce and mixed in terms of the impact of recipient sex on economic 
and human capital outcomes of transfers, there is even less evidence for how different targeting schemes 
affect IPV outcomes (Yoong et al 2012). Across the studies reviewed here, the majority transferred cash 
to women; therefore, a large gap in knowledge remains with respect to impacts on IPV when men are the 
main recipient, as is the case in many programs in Africa. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) is the only study 
 32 
that randomly compared male and female beneficiaries, and found no differential impact on IPV. These 
differences will be particularly important in settings where men are the de facto recipient due to gendered 
mobility constraints and lower perceived cultural acceptability of transferring benefits to women (e.g. 
Middle East and parts of South Asia). 
Lastly, the associated benefits from complementary activities such as trainings and group 
meetings are also likely to be a key factor shaping how a CT program impacts IPV. Complementary 
activities could independently decrease IPV by empowering women through increased knowledge leading 
to increased self-esteem, social interaction, and social capital. Most CT programs reviewed are linked to 
some complementary activities.  While the literature acknowledges that complementary activities might 
play a role in generating impacts, this mechanism is seldom explored explicitly. The Bangladesh study by 
Roy and colleagues (2017) is the only one that attempts to separately evaluate the impact of the transfer 
versus the transfer plus auxiliary activities. They find that decreases in IPV six months post program exist 
only in the cash transfer plus BCC group and not in the CT only group.  
It is worth mentioning that although average impacts of the studies reviewed overwhelmingly 
show decreases in IPV, several studies found increases for select IPV outcomes within particular sub-
groups of beneficiaries (e.g. Bobonis et al. 2013; Hidrobo & Fernald 2013). In addition, we exclude two 
studies where the cash transfers are one-time lump-sum grants as part of larger micro-enterprise program 
with couples’ therapy or bundled livelihood, savings and coaching program. In the first study, Green and 
colleagues (2015) find that women in Northern Uganda receiving the micro-enterprise training alone 
experience increased marital control, while those with added couples therapy do not (and no impacts 
among either group on physical or emotional abuse). In the second study, Ismayilova and colleagues 
(2017) find that women in Burkina Faso benefiting from both arms of bundled savings and livelihoods 
programming experience reduced emotional violence, however this effect is larger for women with those 
receiving family coaching. Therefore, while our assessment is optimistic about the direction and level of 
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impacts on IPV, we recognize that diverse programming variations are yet to be widely tested and 
understood. 
Our review has a number of limitations. We exclude studies that explore the impact of transfers 
on other types of violence that may have implications for IPV, including community-level violence or 
intra-household violence perpetrated or directed at other household members. For example, there is 
increasing interest and some potential for social safety nets, including CTs, to decrease violence against 
children, although the evidence is weak for most types of childhood violence apart from sexual violence 
and abuse among adolescent girls (Peterman et al. 2017a). Conclusions around promising mechanisms for 
reduction of violence against children relate to several of the same that we identify, including increases in 
economic security and decreases in poverty-related stress. This suggests that there is potential for CTs to 
affect multiple types of intra-household violence simultaneously, but no study to date has explored this 
potential. Likewise, transfers could decrease community violence through positive economic spill-overs 
into non-beneficiary households, or could increase violence due to social tensions and jealousy triggered 
by the CT (Adato 2000b, Beasly et al. 2016; Wasilkowska 2011, Slate & Mphale 2008). Finally, we 
cannot generalize our findings on household dynamics to high-income countries or from CTs to broader 
social protection or economic strengthening programs.   
Our findings, however, have important implications for future research. First, evaluations should 
carefully consider the IPV metrics included in their study to ensure they capture internationally validated 
measures of IPV that are sensitive to program impact (Heise and Hossain 2017). To date, we know little 
about how CT may affect the frequency and severity of IPV, which would aid our understanding of 
dynamics at the margin. Second, studies need to go beyond impact to include validated and credible 
measurement of pathways to better understand the behavioral underpinnings of the CT and IPV 
relationship. In doing so, studies will deepen both our understanding of how transfers affect IPV, and our 
understanding of the behavioral relationships underpinning each causal link, many of which are 
understudied in LMICs. It is likely that mixed methods studies will advance our understandings of these 
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links better than either quantitative or qualitative studies alone; however to date few mixed methods 
evaluations have been conducted. There is also need for a better understanding of how program design 
features affect ultimate outcomes and pathways, particularly with respect to targeting, complementary 
programming, program linkages and conditionalities. Of the quantitative studies included in the review, 
only four included a research design able to test program variations (Green et al. 2015; Hidrobo et al. 
2016; Roy et al. 2017; Haushofer & Shapiro 2016), and none were able to test potential synergistic effects 
between program components. There are large regional and contextual gaps in our understanding of 
dynamics, with evidence skewed to Latin America and little understanding of Asia and the Middle East, 
or of how dynamics may differ in humanitarian settings. Evidence from SSA is scarce (particularly 
empirical evidence) and is concentrated in Eastern and Southern Africa, with little evidence arising from 
Western and Central Africa, where gender norms and institutions may vary. Finally, we know little about 
long-term impacts, including how impacts may vary over time horizons and if impacts are non-linear, as 
well as the sustainability of impacts after CTs end or households graduate (the latter studied only by Roy 
et al. 2017).  
 Although our review indicates that CT are promising tools to reduce IPV, this relationship is 
complex and there are large gaps in our understanding of what program design components are necessary 
or beneficial in diverse settings. For example, it is likely that within any one program there are multiple or 
competing casual pathways operative, with differential distributional impacts or those that vary by type of 
IPV. It is also possible that impacts in the short-run may differ from longer-term impacts as relationships 
end and begin and programs are phased out. As cash and other transfers are increasingly scaled up in 
development settings, we welcome further research to better understand and leverage gains across sectors 
on non-traditional outcomes including IPV. 
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